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T83. PROCESSING SPEED PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTIONING IN YOUNG ADOLESCENTS EXPERIENCING AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS

Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland
Background: Neurocognitive impairments are a prevalent aspect of psychosis which, on average, begin in early adolescents, with particular impairment apparent in speed of processing and nonverbal working memory in early stages (Kelleher et al., 2012) . It is important to understand the impact of cognitive impairment on functional ability, particularly in early stages of illness which may assist in the development of targeted therapeutic strategies.
Methods: A population sample of 212 school going adolescents aged 11-13 years partook in the study, which included community-based adolescents who report experiencing psychotic symptoms but who were not clinically diagnosed. Psychotic symptoms were assessed using the psychosis section of the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia. Six cognitive domains were assessed using the MATRICS consensus cognitive battery. Functioning was assessed using the Children's Global Assessment Scale. Six separate linear regression analyses were performed to test if each cognitive domain of the MATRICS battery predicted functioning. Results: In the entire sample (including those who experienced psychotic experiences and those who did not) (n=211), speed of processing significantly explained 8% of the variance in functioning (F(1, 76) = 6.61, p = .0012, R-squared = 0.08.), (Beta = 0.39, p = 0.012). When the sample was subdivided into those who ever experienced auditory hallucinations (AH) (n=62) versus those that did not (n=149), speed of processing significantly predicted 18% of the variance in functioning in the group experiencing AHs (F(2, 33) = 3.82, p =0.032, R-squared = 0.18), (Beta = 0.43, p = 0.06). However, no effect was found in the group without AVs (F(1,40) = 1.19, p =0.28). No other cognitive domain predicted functioning. Discussion: Speed of processing appears to be a core cognitive deficit in psychosis which impacts on functioning in young adolescents particularly in those experiencing psychotic symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, however the variance predicted by processing speed is relatively low. This research highlights the potential of speed of processing as a possible viable target for early intervention in psychotic disorders. Background: Increasingly, the positive symptoms of psychosis are recognized as being on a continuum with phenomena that are experienced by many members of the general population (i.e., non-clinical samples). Delusions are no exception. These fixed false beliefs, which are common in individuals with psychosis, are echoed by inflexible false beliefs in the general population that have delusion-like qualities (e.g., belief in clairvoyance). In a series of studies, we sought to determine whether belief in a particular type of disinformation (fake news) might represent a point on the same continuum as delusions and delusion-like ideation. To this end, we examined whether individuals who endorsed more delusion-like ideation were also more prone to believing fake news. We then examined whether the cognitive mechanisms behind any relationship between delusion-like ideation and fake news were similar to those associated with delusion-like ideation generally. ). Mediation tests were conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 4, with 5000 bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals).
Results: Delusion-like ideation was positively correlated with belief in fake news (rho(501) = .20, p < .001). The relationship between belief in fake news and delusion-like ideation was partially explained by lower levels of analytic thinking ability (as measured by the CRT; completely standardized 95% CI = [.02 .07]) and lower evidence valuation (as measured by AOT scores; completely standardized 95% CI = [.01 .06]). These indirect effects accounted for 39% of the relationship between delusion-like ideation and belief in fake news. Delusion-like ideation and belief in real news were not correlated (rho(501) = 0.01, p = .927). Discussion: Consistent with the notion that belief in fake news represents a point on the same continuum as belief in delusional and delusion-like ideas, belief in fake news was associated with increased endorsement of delusionlike ideation. This relationship was partially explained by factors previously associated with delusions and delusion-like ideation (e.g., lower engagement in analytic thinking, lower valuation of evidence in belief formation and revision). The link between delusion-proneness and belief in fake news (which was established for the first time in these studies) may prove useful in helping to inoculate the public against the deleterious effects of purposelyspread misinformation. Identifying individuals who might be at high risk of falling for fake news is an essential first step in this direction. The present results suggest that individuals who endorse delusion-like ideation may be one population toward which interventions aimed at preventing belief in misinformation might usefully be aimed. 
